QgenticQgentic
Qgentic / security & evidence
Security and vendor risk

Security you can verify yourself.

Attestations ask a vendor risk team for trust. Qgentic gives it something to check instead: every control below can be reproduced in your own environment, against your own data, during technical validation. That is the scrutiny DORA's ICT third-party rules expect a regulated firm to apply.

The Qgentic compliance run report: the named-person approval recorded on the audit chain, the run's platform, tenant and timestamps, a verdict of succeeded with zero validation errors and ten warnings, and eleven audit chains each verified VALID with its entry count. The view is read-only and cannot change the record. The Qgentic compliance run report: the named-person approval recorded on the audit chain, the run's platform, tenant and timestamps, a verdict of succeeded with zero validation errors and ten warnings, and eleven audit chains each verified VALID with its entry count. The view is read-only and cannot change the record.
The compliance run report verifies one run, read-only: who approved it and when the decision reached the audit chain, the deterministic validation result, and every SHA-256 hash chain re-verified with its entry count. It reads the data plane and has no way to write to it, and the same report prints to PDF for an auditor.

The model proposes; code decides

The language model extracts and drafts, and that is all it does. Every validation, classification and final schema compilation is static, deterministic code, and nothing the model produces reaches a regulatory record without passing through that code first.

Deterministic code: validation and logicThe model: extraction and drafting
Cryptographic checksums: ISO 17442 LEI (MOD 97-10), VRN mod-97, FRN regexUnstructured data extraction (contracts, policies) to JSON schema
ISO 3166 / 4217 validation, regime-specific static rules enginesDrafting vendor outreach
Mathematical derivation: VAT aggregation, SLA/tolerance-breach calculationsAgentic exploration and data correlation
SHA-256 audit chaining, IAM/JIT token issuance, payload hashingNothing in the MTD module, which runs with no model at all
The determinism boundary: what the model may do, and what only code decides Untrusted input (contracts, system exports, vendor replies) meets the model inside a contained, non-deterministic layer that may extract, draft, correlate and explain but has no path to the record: its output is a proposal until code verifies it. Deterministic code re-derives every field (LEI and VRN checksums, recomputed totals, ISO code sets, breaches by arithmetic), and a failed rule refuses the run; degradation costs latency, never validity. High-privilege actions require a named approval, then an HMAC-signed grant with a 120-second lifetime and a single action. Every action lands as a hashed entry on tamper-evident chains, re-verifiable offline, and the evidence view reads the chain but cannot change it. § UNTRUSTED INPUT § THE MODEL PROPOSES § THE CODE DECIDES § THE RECORD Contracts & policies PDF · DOCX · free text unstructured, untrusted System exports JSON · CSV · XLSX structured, still untrusted Vendor replies async outreach responses arrive when they arrive NON-DETERMINISTIC · CONTAINED extracts documents to schema drafts vendor outreach correlates master data explains what changed NO PATH TO THE RECORD Model output is a proposal until the code verifies it. MTD runs with no model at all EVERY FIELD RE-DERIVED LEI MOD 97-10 · VRN mod 97 totals recomputed at source ISO 3166 · 4217 code sets breach = timestamp arithmetic A failed rule refuses the run. Degradation costs latency, never validity. APPROVE → MINT → ACT HMAC · ttl=120s · one action The record sha256(prev + entry) every action an entry on a tamper-evident chain five chains re-verified offline, with independent tooling, no vendor needed The evidence view is decoupled and read-only. print it for the auditor The boundary in one line: the model may read, extract and draft; only deterministic code may validate, commit or file, and both sides land on one audit chain.
The determinism boundary, drawn. Untrusted input meets the model inside a contained layer with no path to the record: its output is a proposal until deterministic code re-derives every field and lets it pass. High-privilege actions need a named approval and a 120-second, single-action HMAC grant. Model degradation can slow a run (through retries); it cannot alter a filed record.

Every action on a tamper-evident chain

Hash chains, verified continuously

Each service appends its state changes to its own SHA-256 hash chain, where every entry hashes the previous hash together with the canonical payload. The chains are verified continuously, and you can verify them offline with independent tooling.

entryHash = sha256(prevHash + canonical(entry)) → STATUS: VERIFIED

A run verifies five service chains; in SaaS deployments a sixth audits API gateway activity and IAM approvals. The evidence is packaged as a hashed archive with a readable attribution report, and a complete data export keeps you portable.

No standing privileges

A high-privilege action, such as a regulatory submission or a bulk export, needs a short-lived HMAC-signed grant, and a grant is minted only after an IAM-authenticated person approves. The approval, the minting and the action are each recorded as their own audit event.

iam.approval → token.mint(HMAC, ttl=120s) → action.execute

Where it runs

SaaS

Multi-tenant cloud

Logical isolation between tenants. API credentials are hashed (SHA-256) at rest and shown once, at generation. UK or EU data residency is enforced, and every sub-processor is documented, with contractual notice before any change.

Dedicated

Single-tenant cloud

Physical isolation in a dedicated VPC, with your enterprise KMS holding customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK), and change controls that include named maintenance windows.

Air-gapped

Air-gapped

A statically compiled binary with no external telemetry, no sub-processors and external API access switched off, so processing stays local and deterministic. In-process egress controls block and log outbound requests, and your standard network monitoring can verify all of it.

The delivery mechanics behind the on-premise topologies (cosign-signed images, pinned digests, IT-run updates and the pre-answered change request) are on the deployment and updates page.

Read-only into your ERP

Watched-directory files

Watched-directory integrations inside your perimeter, compatible with legacy ERP exports such as SAP AL11 output. Data flows one way, and Qgentic never needs write access to the source ERP.

REST polling

Read-only integration against REST endpoints you expose, authenticated with scoped bearer tokens. Pull model only: nothing external ever writes into your ERP.

The middleware you already run

Works with the iPaaS you already run, such as SAP CPI, MuleSoft or Boomi. Standardised boundary contracts make integration configuration, not an engineering project.

Bring your due diligence

Before you sign

A full security dossier, a lockfile-generated SBOM, signed binaries with published SHA-256 hashes, source-code review under NDA, and local technical validation. Everything your security team will ask for, ready before they ask.

Get-FileHash qgentic.exe # Verification of published SHA-256

In the contract

Pre-populated DORA register documentation (B_05.01, B_02.02, B_07.01), and schedules carrying Article 30 audit and access rights, defined exit and export protocols, sub-processor limits and documented capability boundaries.